CNT 5412, Spring 2025

PUBLIC-KEY INFRASTRUCTURE

VIET TUNG HOANG


The slides are loosely based on material from Prof. Mihir Bellare (UCSD) and Prof. Stefano Tessaro (UW).

Agenda

1. Certificate Authority (CA)

2. Dealing with Rogue CAs


Previously




Alice generates a pair of secret key and public key.

She keeps sk to herself, and stores pk in a public, trusted database.

Problem



The adversary may replace Alice's real key with its fake one



An Example of X.509 Certificate

	Subject Name	
	Country	US
	State/Province	CA
	Locality	Menlo Park
	Organization	Facebook, Inc.
	Common Name	*.facebook.com
	Issuer Name	
	Country	US
	Organization	DigiCert Inc
	Organizational Unit	www.digicert.com
	Common Name	DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA
PKCS#1 signature	Serial Number	0E CB 09 39 B2 B1 01 54 B8 95 70 C7 B2 2B 7A 47
with SHA-256	Version	3
	Signature Algorithm	SHA-256 with RSA Encryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

Source: Boneh-Shoup's book "A Graduate Course in Applied Crypto"

An Example of X.509 Certificate

	Not Valid Before	Wednesday, August 27, 2014 at 5:00:00 PM Pacific Daylight Time
	Not Valid After	Friday, December 30, 2016 at 4:00:00 AM Pacific Standard Time
	Public Key Info	
	> Algorithm	Elliptic Curve Public Key (1.2.840.10045.2.1)
	Parameters	Elliptic Curve secp256r1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7)
ElGammal on	Public Key	15 8C DB BF 4E 58 BD 47 BE B8 10 FC 22 E9 D2 9E
EC group		98 F8 49 2A 25 FB 94 46 E4 42 99 84 50 1C 5F 01 FD 14 25 31 5C 4E D9 64 FD C5 0C B3 46 D2 A1 BC 70 B4 87 8E
	Key Size	256 bits
	Key Usage	Encrypt, Verify, Derive
	Signature	256 bytes : AA 91 AE 52 01 8C 60 F6 02 B6 94 EB
		AF 6E EB DD 3C C8 E1 6F 17 AB B8 28 80 EC DC 54 82 56 24 C1 16 08 E1 C2 C8 3E 3C 0F 53 18 40 7F
		DF 41 36 93 95 5F B1 D9 35 43 5E 94 60 F9 D6 A7


Source: Boneh-Shoup's book "A Graduate Course in Applied Crypto"

Certificate Chain

CA hierarchy

Root CA CA CA CA CA CA CA User User User User

User's certificate



Only need to know public key of root CAs to verify


Certificate Chain Example

Issued To	Issued By	Expiratio	Friendly Name	
ABA.ECOM Root CA Autoridad Certifica Autoridad Certifica Baltimore EZ by DST Belgacom E-Trust P C&W HKT SecureN C&W HKT SecureN C&W HKT SecureN C&W HKT SecureN	ABA.ECOM Root CA Autoridad Certificador Autoridad Certificador Baltimore EZ by DST Belgacom E-Trust Prim C&W HKT SecureNet C&W HKT SecureNet C&W HKT SecureNet	7/9/2009 6/28/2009 6/29/2009 7/3/2009 1/21/2010 10/16/2009 10/16/2009 10/16/2010 10/16/2009	DST (ABA.ECOM Autoridad Certifi Autoridad Certifi DST (Baltimore E Belgacom E-Trus CW HKT Secure CW HKT Secure CW HKT Secure	
Import Export	<u>R</u> emove		Advanc	cec

Certificate Chain Example

Issued To	Issued By	Expirati	o F	riendly Name	
DigiCert Global CA GlobalSign Root CA Microsoft Windows Microsoft Windows Microsoft Windows MS SGC Authority Root Agency SecureNet CA SGC Thawte Premium Se	24 지금 방송 44 방송 휴가님은 영양을 가 잘 알았을까?	7/14/20 1/27/20 2/22/20 12/30/20 12/30/20 12/31/20 12/31/20 10/15/20	14 < 06 < 002 < 002 < 009 < 039 <	None> None> None> None> None> None> None> None>	
mport Export ertificate intended purpose	Remove s			Advand	ec

Certificate Chain Example



Usability Issue

• • • / D Privacy error ×	Chrome 4
← → C (& https://sha1.badesl.com	승
0	
Your connection is not private	
·	
Attackers might be trying to steal your information from sha1.badssl.com (for example,	
passwords, messages, or credit cards). NET: ERR_CERT_WEAK_BIGNATURE_ALBORITHM	
Advanced Back to safety	

Modern browsers complain if certificates are not valid

But users still can bypass the warning, and many people do

Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are still a threat on large scale

Real-world MITM Attacks

C

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/new_nsa_leak_sh.html

<u>Blog</u> >

New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services

The Brazilian television show "Fantastico" <u>exposed</u> an NSA training presentation that discusses how the agency runs man-in-the-middle attacks on the Internet. The point of the story was that the NSA engages in <u>economic espionage</u> against Petrobras, the Brazilian giant oil company, but I'm more

interested in the tactical details.

The <u>video on the webpage</u> is long, and includes what I classroom, but a few screen shots are important. The phow the NSA's MITM attack works:

However, in some cases GCHQ and the NSA and controversial route -- on at least one occa Google directly by performing a man-in-the-mi security certificates. <u>One document</u> published NSA presentation that also contains some GC done" to apparently spoop on SSL traffic. The



Thursday, 04 September 2014 23:55:00 (UTC/GMT)

Analysis of Chinese MITM on Google

The Chinese are running a MITM attack on SSL encrypted traffic between Chinese universities and Google. We've performed technical analysis of the attack, on request from GreatFire.org, and can confirm that it is a real SSL MITM against www.google.com and that it is being performed from within China.

We were contacted by GreatFire.org yesterday (September 3) with a request to analyze two packet captures from suspected MITM-attacks before they finalized their blog post. The conclusions from our analysis is now published as part of GreatFire.org's great blog post titled "Authorities launch man-in-the-middle attack on Google".

Agenda

1.Certificate Authority (CA)

2. Dealing with Rogue CAs

When CAs Get Hacked

Comodo hacker: I hacked DigiNotar too; other CAs breached

The hacker behind this year'

PETER BRIGHT - 9/6/2011, 5:36 PM

Digital certificate breach at Indian authority also targeted Yahoo domains, possibly others

The full scope of the security breach is currently unknown, a Google security engineer said


Lucian Constantin (IDG News Service) on 11 July, 2014 01:22

VeriSign issues fraudulent Microsoft certificates

John Fontana (Computerworld)

26 March, 2001 11:09

Certificate Pinning



Approach 1: Advertise via HTTPs Header:

-SHA-256(DigiCert cert)


-Validity period

Cert of DigiCert from root CA, not Facebook's cert

Approach 2:

Pre-configure browsers

Certificate Revocation




- One should download CRL from CA before validating cert
- Before Alice trusts Bob, she should make sure he's not in the CRL

Improve Bandwidth Efficiency


- CLR is huge \rightarrow bandwidth issue

- Solution: Online querying



Where to Download CLR or Query?

Information can be found in certificate



URL to query -