Authenticated Encryption

Viet Tung Hoang

Agenda

1. **AE and Its Security Definitions**

2. **Failed Ways to Build AE**

3. **Generic Compositions**

4. **Padding-Oracle Attack on SSL/TLS**

Motivation: Challenge-Response Revisited



Question: Break this identification mechanism if encryption is CTR.

Solution: Authenticated Encryption



Privacy **Authenticity**

Encryption scheme

Authenticated Encryption

Achieve **both** of these aims

MAC

Authenticated Encryption (AE)

Emerged ~ 2000

Begin with two **realizations**

1. Authenticity is routinely needed/assumed
2. “Standard” privacy mechanisms don’t provide it

Provide an easier-to-correctly-use abstraction boundary

AE Syntax


$\mathcal{K}$
$
K
Key Gen
M
$\mathcal{E}$
$
C
K
Encrypt
C
$\mathcal{D}$
M
or $\perp$
K
Decrypt
Decryption may reject invalid ciphertexts

Defining Security for AE

Authenticity

-Use Left-or-Right security for privacy

$\text{Auth}_{\mathcal{E}}$

procedure Initialize()
$K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$

procedure Enc(M)
Return $\mathcal{E}_K(M)$

procedure Finalize(C')
Return $(\mathcal{D}_K(C') \neq \perp)$



$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\text{auth}}_{\mathcal{T}}(A) = \Pr[\text{Auth}^{A}_{\mathcal{E}} \Rightarrow 1]$$

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Plain Encryption Doesn't Provide Authenticity



Question: Does CBC provide authenticity?

Answer: No, because any ciphertext has valid decryption

A Bad Fix: CBC with Redundancy



On decryption, verify the decrypted last block is zero.

Question: Break the authenticity of this scheme with a single Enc query

An Attack



Enc
C_0 C_1 C_2 C_3
$\mathcal{A}$
M_1 0^n
C_0 C_1 C_2
C_0 M_1 0^n 0^n
E_K E_K E_K
C_1 C_2 C_3
C_1 C_2
E_K^{-1} E_K^{-1}
C_0
M_1 0^n

Complex Redundancy Doesn't Help



The redundancy is verified upon decryption

Question: Break the authenticity of this scheme with a single Enc query

An Attack



Enc
M
M_1
$h(M_1)$
C_0
C_1
C_2
C_3
A
C_0
C_1
C_2
C_0
M_1
$h(M_1)$
$h(M)$
E_K
E_K
E_K
C_1
C_2
C_3
C_1
C_2
E_K^{-1}
E_K^{-1}
C_0
M_1
$h(M_1)$

A Case Study: WEP

Used in IEEE WiFi standard

24-bit IV is a part of the ciphertext



Attack 1: Exploiting Short IV



Assume all messages are of the same length, and fairly long

Goal: recover at least one message

Attack 1: Exploiting Short IV



Aim for an IV collision

For 24-bit IV's, how many ctx to wait for collision prob ≈ 0.5?

Attack 1: Exploiting Short IV



$$\underbrace{\boxed{\mathrm{IV}\|C_1} \quad \boxed{\mathrm{IV}\|C_2}}_{\text{Same IV, can recover } M_1 \oplus M_2}$$

Attack 2: Chop-Chop Attack



Goal: recover the underlying message by exploiting Dec queries

Attack 2: Chop-Chop Attack
Illustrated Via A Simpler Variant of WEP



Example: $\mathrm{Parity}(10011) = 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 1 = 1$

Attack 2: Chop-Chop Attack
Illustrated For 4-bit Message



Decryption In CloseUp



Compare with $\mathrm{Parity}(M_1 M_2 M_3)$

Exploit Decryption Response



IV C_1 C_2 C_3 C_4

If valid, $M_1 \oplus M_2 \oplus M_3 \oplus M_4 = 0$

Exploit Decryption Response



IV C_1 C_2 C_3 C_4

If invalid, $M_1 \oplus M_2 \oplus M_3 \oplus M_4 = 1$

Exploit Decryption Response



Exploit Decryption Even Further



Solve A System of Linear Equations

$$\begin{cases} M_1 \oplus M_2 \oplus M_3 \oplus M_4 = \square \\ M_1 \oplus M_2 \oplus M_3 = \square \\ M_1 \oplus M_2 = \square \\ M_1 = \square \end{cases}$$

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2. Failed Ways to Build AE

3. **Generic Compositions**

4. Padding-Oracle Attack on SSL/TLS

Constructing AE: Generic Composition

A good PRF, such as Encrypted CBC-MAC

Privacy-only encryption (such as CTR/CBC)



Compose them to build AE

Method	**Usage**
Encrypt-and-MAC	SSH
MAC-then-Encrypt	SSL/TLS
Encrypt-then-MAC	IPSec

Encrypt-and-MAC: Simple Composition



Privacy	Authenticity
No	No

for some bad encryption scheme

No privacy: encrypting the same message results in the same tag

No authenticity if one can modify C such that decryption is unchanged.

Encrypt-and-MAC in SSH

Privacy	**Authenticity**
Yes	Yes



MAC-then-Encrypt



Privacy	Authenticity
Yes	No

for some bad encryption scheme

No authenticity if one can modify C such that decryption is unchanged.

MAC-then-Encrypt in TLS



Privacy	Authenticity
Yes	Yes

Encrypt-then-MAC



Privacy	Authenticity
Yes	Yes

A Common Pitfall in Implementing EtM

Happened in ISO 1972 standard, and in RNCryptor of iOS



Forget to feed IV into MAC

Break auth with one query

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The Padding-Oracle Attack

“Lucky Thirteen” attack snarfs cookies protected by SSL encryption

Exploit is the latest to subvert crypto used to secure Web transactions.

by D

Meaner POODLE bug that bypasses TLS crypto bites 10 percent of websites

Some of the world's leading sites are vulnerable to an easier, more simplified attack.

by D

Researchers poke hole in custom crypto built for Amazon Web Services

Even when engineers do everything by the book, secure crypto is still hard.

by D

New TLS encryption-busting attack also impacts the newer TLS 1.3

Researchers discover yet another Bleichenbacher attack variation (yawn!).

Attack Model: Chosen Prefix Secret Suffix



Goal: Recover M

This Model Is Realistic: Attacking SSL



This Model Is Realistic: Attacking SSL

M

cookie with bank.com

Encrypted communication via SSL

Bank of America

bank.com

Request resource

/AA at bank.com

attacker.com

This Model Is Realistic: Attacking SSL

M

encrypted

GET /AA cookie: M

Bank of America

bank.com

attacker.com

This Model Is Realistic: Attacking SSL



Enc oracle

Dec oracle

Encryption In SSL: MAC-then-Encrypt



Patching In SSL Encryption



Secure if implement properly

Careless Implementation Leads To Attack



-**Secure** if return a single error signal

-**Broken** if tell what kind of error it is.

Scanning For Vulnerable Implementations



Implementation Is Hard: Timing Leakage



Source: Canvel et al, CRYPTO 2003

How To Attack
Illustration For Two-block Message



Recover Last Byte of Second Block



CBC Decryption



$$V = M_2 \oplus C_1 \oplus R$$



If V ends with a zero byte



Bad tag signal