CNT 5412, Spring 2025

INTRODUCTION

VIET TUNG HOANG

Some slides are based on material from Prof. Stefano Tessaro (University of Washington) and Prof. Dan Boneh (Stanford)

Agenda

1. The Internet & Its Problems


2. HTTP Issues

3. IP Issues

4. Privacy Issue

The Internet

Global network that provides **best-effort delivery** of packets between connected hosts



OSI Layer Model

How does Application DNS SSH **HTTP** Application layer structure data? How do I get to the right service? **UDP** TCP Transport layer How to have a reliable stream of data? Network layer How a packet get to a final destination? IP How to get to the next hop? Cellular WiFi Ethernet Link layer




IT'S BACK -

DNS bug

Linux has a serious security problem that once again enables DNS cache poisoning

Bizarre behavior overlooked in Linux for more than a decade revives scary attack scenario.

DAN GOODIN - 11/17/2021, 8:36 AM



2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS

of the

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION



Interception of Internet Traffic

For a brief period in April 2010, a state-owned Chinese telecommunications firm "hijacked" massive volumes of Internet traf-fic.* 114 Evidence related to this incident does not clearly indicate

whether it was perp However, computer bility could enable se

The New Hork Times



The Lede

The New York Times News Blog

Routing bugs Pakistan Blamed for Worldwide YouTube Break

By MIKE NIZZA FEBRUARY 25, 2008 9:34 AM

If all had gone according to plan, Pakistan would have been the latest government taking part in an unsettling trend from Bra Thailand: YouTube blocking. Unlike its predecessors, though, Pakistan also affected thousands of people beyond its borders

Crypto bugs



How Heartbleed Broke the Internet — And Why It Can Happen Again

It's no surprise that a small bug could cause such huge problems. What's amazing, however, is that the code that contained this bug was overseen by only one full-time paid employee.



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HTTP Issues

Was <u>not</u> designed with security



Privacy issue: Adversary can read Alice's emails

HTTP Issues

Was <u>not</u> designed with security



Authenticity issue: Adversary can modify Alice's emails

HTTP Issues

Was not designed with security

I'm Gmail





Impersonation: Adversary can pretend to be Gmail

The Fix: HTTPS

Standard HTTP

HTTP

HTTP


TCP: port 80

TLS


TCP: port 443

TLS encrypts and authenticates HTTP data No change to HTTP itself

Cookie Cutter Attack on TLS




Cookie Cutter Attack on TLS





Cookie must be sent via HTTPS

Message Is Split If URL Path Is Too Long





What Happens If Second Frame Is Blocked?



Cookie is sent in the clear via standard HTTP



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
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
Security Issues with IP



Anyone can talk to any one

No source address authentication in general (spoofing)

Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks



Goal: prevent legitimate users from accessing victim (1.2.3.4)

Example: ICMP ping flood


ICMP = Internet Control Message Protocol, used to relay control/error/ diagnostic message, on top of IP

```
$ ping www.example.com
PING www.example.com (93.184.216.119): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 93.184.216.119: icmp_seq=0 ttl=56 time=11.632 ms
64 bytes from 93.184.216.119: icmp_seq=1 ttl=56 time=11.726 ms
64 bytes from 93.184.216.119: icmp_seq=2 ttl=56 time=10.683 ms
64 bytes from 93.184.216.119: icmp_seq=3 ttl=56 time=9.674 ms
--- www.example.com ping statistics ---
4 packets transmitted, 4 packets received, 0.0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 9.674/10.929/11.726/0.831 ms
```

Send ICMP "ping" message


• Host must respond to all ping requests with a pong reply containing the exact data received in the request message.

A Possible DoS Attack: ICMP Ping Flood



- Attacker sends ICMP pings as fast as possible to victim
- When will this work as a DoS? Attacker resources > victim's
- How can this be prevented? Ingress filtering near victim


How Can Attacker Avoid Ingress Filtering?



Send packet with fake source IP


Packet will get routed correctly, but replies will not

DoS Reflection Attacks




Attacker can attack 8.7.3.4 by bouncing packets from 1.2.3.4 "Frame" 1.2.3.4

DoS Amplification Attacks



DNS works better if attacker spends much less resource than the victim

Another Issue of IP



IP packets are sent in the clear, leading to privacy and authenticity issues

A Solution: IPSec

Alice's gateway 1.2.3.4





Dest: Bob

Payload

IP packet

Bob's gateway 5.6.7.8







A Solution: IPSec

Alice's gateway 1.2.3.4




Source: 1.2.3.4

Dest: 5.6.7.8

IPSec header



Encrypted IP packet







A Solution: IPSec

Alice's gateway 1.2.3.4



In Hw4 you'll break IPSec (for some configuration choice)



Bob's gateway 5.6.7.8



Source: Alice

Dest: Bob

Payload



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The End Of Privacy

FORBES > TECH

How Target Figured Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did

Kashmir Hill Former Staff

Welcome to The Not-So Private Par

ASIA & PACIFIC

China's scary lesson to the world: Censoring the Internet works



By Simon Denyer

May 23, 2016 at 3:01 p.m. EDT

Associated Press Sat 3 May 2014 01.27 EDT



Everyone is under surveillance now, says whistleblower Edward Snowden


People's privacy is violated without any suspicion of wrongdoing, former National Security Agency contractor claims

Stop Third-Party Tracking




Protect Content Of Your Web Surfing: HTTPS

Chrome Page Loads over HTTPS



But HTTPS Doesn't Protect Metadata



Big Brother knows Alice sent an encrypted message to Human Rights Watch

Naïve Approach To Protect Metadata: VPN







Naïve Approach To Protect Metadata: VPN

TECHNOLOGY

LulzSec Hacker Exposed by the Service He Thought Would Hide Him

Hidemyass.com didn't, gave details on hacker to investigators instead

The Regis

This article is more than 1 year old

HideMyAss defends role in LulzSec hack arrest

By Adam Martin

Anons vow to give ass-hiders a hiding


John Leyden

Mon 26 Sep 2011 // 13:27 UTC

"As a legitimate company we will cooperate with law enforcement if we receive a court order"

Tor ("The Onion Router")


Tor operates by tunnelling traffic through three **random** "onion routers"



Who Knows What


Knows Alice is using Tor and the identity of the middle node, but not the destination Entry guard Encrypted by Tor · · · Not encrypted by Tor Tor client Tor Destination network Middle relay Exit relay

Who Knows What



Who Knows What

Knows a Tor user is connecting to it via the exit node Entry guard Encrypted by TorNot encrypted by Tor Tor client Tor Destination network Middle relay Exit relay



Tor implements more complex version of this basic idea

Tor Is Not A Panacea



TECH BY VICE

How the NSA (Or Anyone Else) Can Crack Tor's Anonymity

Researchers identified 81 percent of people using the service with a honeypot scheme and some statistical analysis.



By Jason Koebler