

CIS 5371, FALL 2024

SOME ODD PROBLEMS IN CRYPTO

VIET TUNG HOANG

Agenda

1. The dating problem

2. Telephone coin flipping

The Dating Problem

Issue: Embarrassing if one wants a second date while the other doesn't.




Privacy for The Dating Problem

Want: Each person only knows:


- His/her choice & the final outcome
- Whatever **can be inferred** from the above



Bob's Privacy for the Dating Problem




Alice knows Bob's input = "agree"



Alice knows Bob's input = "disagree"




In those cases Bob's privacy is moot

Bob's Privacy for the Dating Problem



Must reveal **no information** about Bob's input



How to Solve the Dating Problem: 5-card Trick




How to Solve the Dating Problem: 5-card Trick



Alice's cards



Bob's cards



Agree

Two cards shown side-by-side: the Ace of Clubs on the left and the Ace of Hearts on the right. Both cards have the letter 'A' and their respective suit symbols in the corners.

Agree

Two cards shown side-by-side: the Ace of Hearts on the left and the Ace of Clubs on the right. Both cards have the letter 'A' and their respective suit symbols in the corners.

Disagree


Two cards shown side-by-side: the Ace of Hearts on the left and the Ace of Clubs on the right. Both cards have the letter 'A' and their respective suit symbols in the corners.

Disagree

Two cards shown side-by-side: the Ace of Clubs on the left and the Ace of Hearts on the right. Both cards have the letter 'A' and their respective suit symbols in the corners.

How to Solve the Dating Problem: 5-card Trick


Alice's cut



Each takes turn to make a **private** cut


How to Solve the Dating Problem: 5-card Trick

Bob's cut




Each takes turn to make a **private** cut

How to Solve the Dating Problem: 5-card Trick







If three ♥ in a (wrap-around) row then date. Otherwise no date

Why Is the Solution Correct?






There are **ten** ways to place 3 ♥ and 2 ♣ in a line

But There Are **Two** Groups When Wrap Around




The Initial Place





Date: Group 1

No Date: Group 2

Cutting Doesn't Change the Group



Circular shift



Why Is the Solution Private?

Your Exercise

Agenda

1. The dating problem

2. Telephone coin flipping

Telephone Coin Flipping



Alice and Bob want to decide who gets the car (**over the phone**)

Alice's proposal:

- Alice tosses a coin and **informs** Bob of the outcome
- Bob gets the car if the coin lands head




Telephone Coin Flipping



Goal:

- Both Alice and Bob learn the outcome of a fair coin toss
- Nobody can cheat the other




A Physical Solution






A Physical Solution




M



A Physical Solution




A Physical Solution



$$\text{Output} = \text{ } \left(\text{ } \oplus \text{ } \right) \text{ }$$

The equation is displayed inside a light gray rectangular box. The text "Output =" is on the left. To its right is a blue circle containing the letter M , followed by a circle containing a plus sign (\oplus), followed by an orange circle containing the letter M' .



How to Implement A Digital Locked Box

First attempt:

- A locked box containing a bit M is an encryption $C \leftarrow E_K(M)$
- The key to open the box is the key K

What can go wrong?

- Bob can send a **fake** key K' so that $E_{K'}^{-1}(C)$ is **another** bit of her choice

We Actually Need a **Bit Commitment Scheme**


Commit: $(C, K) \leftarrow \text{Comm}(M)$

$M \in \{0, 1\}$

Decommit: $M' \leftarrow \text{DeComm}(K, C)$

$M' \in \{0, 1\} \cup \{\perp\}$

How to put a bit
in a locked box



We Actually Need a **Bit Commitment Scheme**


Commit: $(C, K) \leftarrow \text{Comm}(M)$

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
$M' \in \{0, 1\} \cup \{\perp\}$

How to open



Security Requirements of Bit Commitment


Hiding: Committal C reveals **nothing** about M



Alice can't learn the value in the locked box

Security Requirements of Bit Commitment

Binding: It's **hard** to find C^* , K_0 , K_1 such that $\text{DeComm}(K_0, C^*) = 0$ and $\text{DeComm}(K_1, C^*) = 1$



Bob can't construct a box that he can open to both 0 and 1

A Simple Bit Commitment Scheme

Commit to 0:

- Pick two 1024-bit primes p, q such that

$$\begin{cases} p < q \\ p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}, q \equiv 1 \pmod{4} \end{cases}$$



Commit to 1:

- Pick two 1024-bit primes p, q such that

$$\begin{cases} p < q \\ p \equiv 1 \pmod{4}, q \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \end{cases}$$

Committed: $N = pq$

Key: (p, q)



Implementing Decommitment

Try this at home